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1SECTION OMB
The purpose of this thesis is to make, from the idealistic point of
view, a critical comparison of the views concerning the nature of human
personality of several recent idealistic thinkers w ith the views of Plato,
and to re-examine the problem in the light of this comparison.
It is customary, in dealing with a problem of this scope, carefully
to define and delimit, in order, insofar as is possible, to avoid con-
fusion of terms. However, in the various writers studied in preparation
for this ^hesis, each has his own distinct terminology. It will simplify
matters, then, if after we discuss the findings of each man, we at that
point determine in what sense he uses the words. Later, in Section Four,
conclusions and summarizing definitions will be offered for the terms under
discussion. It would be fruitless, for exemple, to ask what we mean by
unity, as several definitions of the word are possible, and are found in
the writings of the philosophers upon 'whose opinions we are turning the
searchlight of our attention. Personality, too, is susceptible of many
different interpretations. W9 shall see what various writers have meant
by the word and what synonyms they have used for it; and examine the
evidence the- adduce. This will be the material upon whioh definitions
may be built, in the hope that the findings or beliefs of some idealistic
thinkers may present an interesting contribution to the material available
toward a rational answer to the question of the nature of human personality.
In the following section, the thoughts of Plato as the first critical
student of the problem, will be discussed.
Then there will be attempted a comparison and contrast with Plato of
certain modern thinkers who have dealt with the subject. Those whose
l.It is often defined as a superficial or evanescent quality of the
individual, something put on or developed, as an aid to personal or
social success; this use of the term is never Pound in philosophy
however.
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ideas have been taken as material for this thesis are Bowne, Royce, and
Laird; and last but not least, Dr. Edgar Sheffield Brigh+man, who has
been the present writer's philosophy professor for nearly all her under-
graduate and graduate work, and without whose help and inspiration she
never would have found the way to be a seeker after the truth.
In the final section will be an explanation of conclusions about
personality, and a brief summary of all points elaborated in preceding
sections. At the very end will be found the Bibliography, which contains
the sources from which material has been taken.

3.
SECTION TWO
Plato, which is the name by v.rhich we know the first thinker who,
with his teacher Socrates, really considered our problem synoptically^
seems, according to the best available evidence, to have been born about
4°7 B. C. of well-to-do Athenian parents. They gave him the best educa-
tion possible to obtain^and he had sufficient means so that he could em-
ploy his time as he wished. His mind seems always to have been active
and to have ranged widely over all fields. But philosophic material at
that period was rather meagre. One or two of his predecessors had left
a few vague impressions of their ideas of how the world became what they
believed it to be, and of whether knowledge was possible; and some of the
early Oriental religions had left fragments; but in the main Plato had to
work these theories out for himself, and study cri tically what he found
through his own experience and serious thought.
While still a young man Plato came in contact with Socrates, and his
particular character and method have had a large influence on Plato. The
work of these two men is inextricably woven into the pattern of Plato's
dialogues, and we obtain by far the greater part of our ideas of the mas-
ter through the eyes of his most famous pupil. The "higher Criticism" of
the text, to determine which ideas were those of Socrates and which of
Plato, is entirely outside the scope of this thesis, and irrelevant to
its problem. No attempt will be made here to distinguish the thoughts
of Plato from those of his teacher, but all ideas presented in the Dia-
logues with Plato's apparent approval will be attributed to him. In
deference to the difficulties experienced by critics who have made a
lifelong study of the question of authorship, the ideas of both will be
called Platonic.
Socrates' method of seeking truth was that of drawing out in con-
versation with people, their ideas, he himself professing ignorance; and
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this was developed by Plato into the artistic style of the dialogue,
which had the added advantage of recording each level of thought as he
advanced to it. He was seeking always for a sound explanation of the
universe; failing this, he would make definitions of abstract, ideal
qualities with a view to going on from there to a tenable hypothesis of
the nature of life and the soul. This method led his hearers toward a
valid metaphysics.
While we are not concerned herejjw ith all the Platonic system, (if
such it may be called)
5
in order to understand his view of the soul, we must
have something of his background of metaphysics.
He thought first about the universe as we know it. How did it come
to be in the form in which we find it? Yfas it always existing, uncaused?
If not, what caused it? In the Timaeus we find the myth of the creation
clearly expounded. In Plato's view the first thing a philosopher had to
do was to show what, in his opinion, was the cause of the world. He at-
tempts a thoroughgoing teleological explanation of the universe. To do
this he makes a distinction betw^een cause proper (final cause), and aux-
iliary cause (the necessary physical conditions, or the environment)^ also
between the use of Intelligence and Necessity in creating the -world out of
chaos. He finds an intrinsic incorrigible element always in the world,
which he goes on to describe in detail later; this militates against per-
fection. He also finds a distinction between Being and Becoming, the
changing end the changeless, the ideal and the phenomenal. The universe
belongs, of course, to the latter class.
This universe was created by the Demi-urge, who really systematized
and ordered what He found in the pre-e;:isting Chaos. At a certain stage
He hands the universe over to His creature gods, and retires into solitude,

5except for certain operations requiring purpose, which He alone can admin-
ister. The Demi-urge is the embodiment of the Good, and the source of all
knowledge and all existence, but not identical with it. He uses it. He is
an Intelligence, whereas Ideas are objects of Intelligence.
The primary object of the Demi-urge is to construct the World-Soul , to
t
cause it to come into existence. This means that mechanical causation is
not enough to account for the world. We must have a primary cause of motion.
(This is explained clearly in Phaedrus
.
) This principle, or primary cause
is the psyche, the Demi-urge—ultimately God, who is the energy of creation.
The World-Soul, creation of the Demi-urge is said to be:
a. Composed of three elements—sameness, otherness, and being, (both
changeless and changing, indivisible and divisible.) Each portion, of which
there are a mathematically chosen numbei^ contains the same proportion of
Some, Other, and Being, welded indissolubly. The Soul is older and better
than Body.(?) It stretches throughout the whole of the Body, and envelopes
the exterior also. It is built into the Body, united centre to centre, and
then begins its own peculiar motion to make unceasing intelligent life for
all time. (4) It is invisible, while the body is visible. God gave the
World-Soul Time, a movable image of eternity, (5)
b« Constructed to combine one part of Some to seven of Other.
c» An explanation of heavenly bodies— the spherical soul is the most
perfect and complete form.
d» Motion- introducing. There are many different kinds of motion in
the Soul, and it can move other things besides itself.
This was, of course, the World-Soul, from which the gods were created.
They were immortal. But according to the Plan, contemplated by the Demi-
urge, there were to be other kinds of creatures too, who should be mortal,
although possessing Soul. If the Demi-urge created those Himself, as He
might very well have done, they they would have been equal to the gods.
So He gave the power to fashion bodies to the lesser gods <hile He Y^ould
1 POP 4
2 Sec. 245e
3 Timaeus 34o & ff
4 Timaeus 36e & ff
5 Timaeus 37e

sow Soul, and £ive it to the gods at the proper time. This Soul-Mixture
He made less pure than that of the gods, and divided into portions equal
in number to the stars. He showed these new souls the universe and the
laws of destiny. He told them that Necessity compels them to be implanted
in bodies sometime. This confinement would give them sensation, desire,
and other emotions. If the soul masters these, it will live justly; if
not, u .justly. Then he saved them in the organs of Time and told the yo^ung
gods to &o ahead mak'ng bodies for the souls. Theirs was to be the
responsibility for governingjvCell these mortal creatures. 7
Bodies were made by the gods out of fire, earth, -stater and air, and
fastened "with numerous pegs, invisible for smallness." within these
bodies they bound the immortal souls. The head, the top, is spherical,
the most divine part, the seat of the immortal soul; the rest of the body
is to be its servant. The bodily conditions are part of the auxiliary
9
causes spoken of above, in contradistinction to the first or final cause •
It is important that we note here the relationship of Reason to the
Soul. It seems to be Plato's final considered opinion that Reason is the
one part of the human soul hich might be said to have the power to func-
tion separately from the rest. However, it never actually becomes sepa-
10
rate. The mythical form of the explanation makes the cleavage more clear-
cut than Plato means it to be.
We might say that for Plato the part of man he called soul is the part
which is divine, most like God. Havever, in accepting this definition we
must remember that Plato is here speaking of the immortal part of the soul,
the Reason. This is the moral side of man, hich is constantly trying, or
should try, to do right, and listen to the voice of God. One must con-
stantly strive to make himself as good as possible, then he Will have
nothing to fear. A person's mind his (immortal) soul, his reason, is the
most important.
Tii.'.aeas
, Sec. 41 b & c.
7 Timaeus, Sec. 42

thing about his personality. The logic of this is that through the mind
one perceives the eternal ideas, therefore the mind is the immortal part
of man. The only way a person can be convinced of anything is through his
mind, by reference to his recollection of these eternal ideas of which he
13
knew before he was bora. The body is a sort of prison-house for the mind,
although Plato admits he does not altogether understand this. The mind or
soul dwells in this prison of the body, as we have seen. Plato also compares
the body to an oyster-shell.
Going back to our original account of the universe, besides the M del,
Plan or Pattern, which is intelligible and pre-existent, and the 6opy, or
the World-Soul, a Creature, we find still a third Form, the Receptacle.
This is a ver^ elusive conception which Plato discusses only in the Timaeus
,
where he calls it "the nurse of all Becoming,"^ which is really not much
help in defining it. But Plato finds a need for such a notion in the fact
16?that elements change from one to another* The Receptacle receives all
forms and can become anything. It never changes its quality, although it
16 17
appears different at different times. Devoid of all form itself, it yet
Jk 18
in some way is possess of Intelligence. The Receptacle brings together
^ 19
the similar and separates the dissimilar.
Being is an object of thought, Becoming of opinion. Thought, or
Reason, and opinion are two different faculties and dealw ith two differ-
ent classes of objects. Reason deals only with Forms, or Ideas, Being.
On the other hand Becoming is something we can only have opinions about,
— an object of sense, for in-
13 Phaedo
,
Sec. 62 17 Timaeus
, 50d
14 Timaeus, 49a & ff 18 Timaeus
, 51b15 iimaeus
, 49d '
16 Timaeus, 49c 19 Timaeus, 53a

20
stance# Only gods and a very few men have Reason.
The Reason is part of the immortal soul, as we have said. The mor-
21
tal part includes the passions, and is fastened in the chest. It is
22
subject to appetite for food and drink, ' and in general partakes more of
the nature of the body. These parts are located in the chest and the abdo-
23
men and are attached to the body by bonds connected to the bone-marrow
which is the ground-stuff from which the mortal part of the soul develops.
From it "bonds of the immortal or whole Soul were cast out, and the body
24built around. " The bones that have most soul have least flesh, and
25
vice-versa. There is also a third kind of Soul" for sensation, a
placid, vegetable type of soul which has no movement.
The Body, as we have seen, is a composition of the four elements,
Earth, Fire, Air, end Water. Disease results from an excess or deficiency
27 28
of any one of "he four. Folly is a disease of the soul which is due to
some condition of the body. The best prevention or cure of disease is to
29
exercise soul and body together, to imitate the perfect form of the
Universe*
To summarize his view of creation, thcn^God, the Cause^ according to
Pattern creates in the Receptacle (which is primordial chaos or givenness.)
The union of the Forms in the Receptacle is transient, a flux. (Thi_s
suggests modern physics.) The w^brld points in these three directions, to
God, to the Pattern and to the Receptacle. Add to this the creature thus
31
made, and you have the four kinds of Being* The creature is a "world of
passage," the creative factors, including the Receptacle, are unchanging.
The relation of God to this created, concrete world is one of cause and
35 34
effect," as it is a copy of being, an imitation of God.* The world is a
32
20 Timaeus , 52 e 27 Timaeus , Sec. 82 a
21 Timaeu s, 69 d 28 Timaeus
, Sec. 86 b
22 Timaeus , 70 e 29 Plato, Timaeus , Sec. 88 c
23 Timaeus
, 73 b 30 Demos, POP , 5
24 Timaeus
, 73 e 31 Plato, Timaeus , 48 e
25 Timaeus
, Sec. 75 e 32 Plato, Timaeus , 50 b
26 Timaeus
, Sec. 77 b & c 33 Demos, POP, 6
34 Plato, Timaeus, 29

9.
systematic unity, then, since it is a copy of 'he ideal >ur view de-
cane to the conclusion (discussed in the Timaeus)
that the Universe is one, Plato had undertaken a psychological and philos-
ophical analysis of the human soul. This is largely found in the Phaedo
and the Phaedrus
,
where he is discussing death and immortality, and
rhetoric, respectively. Soul appears as an integration of all the spirit-
ual factors, and might be termed an expression of God. In phaedrus^ it
is referred to as self-moving motion. It moves other things besides it-
self, and so can be defined as activity and becoming, or the principle of
transition—the substitution of something new for what is gone
—
perpetual
perishing, perpetual renewal* The soul is immortal because one of its
elements is Being, which is eternal; it is self-restoring and self-^re-
producing by the constant generation of life—the principle of the soul
—
from death," (Opposites are generated from opposites.) It is the seat
of all activity in nature. This activity follows a planned pattern for the
achievement of value by reason.
The soul knows things, through reason, but the body is the vehicle of
the soul for finding and expressing this knowledge. To explain this,
Plato decides that, while being a unity, the soul is to a certain extent
homogeneous with the body; that is all body contains something of the
soul, and all soul something of the body. This view reminds one of the
theological view of some people toda^ , that Christ was human as we are,
but in a lesser degree; and re are divine as He ",ras, but in a lesser
degree. This means that Soul is a mixture of material and immaterial;
this is a very confused thought, and undoubtedly occured because Plato's
scientific knowledge had not kept pace with the range of his speculation
35 Demos, POP, 6
36 Demos, POP, 7
37 Plato, Timaeus . 55d
38 Plato, Phaedrus, Sec, 245
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about the soul. lie had no clear idea of the nature of matter; but it seems
reasonable to suppose that, given the facts known today by modern science,
he would have been an idealist. But as it was he had not found any one fac-
tor to which all 'he universe is reducible, so the Soul conception is not
clear.
For Plato, the soul is composed of Reason, Spirit, and Desire—the
"tri-partite" Soul of the Phaedrus where the soul is described as two
winged horses and a charioteer; a one in a many, simple and yet complex.
It is important that there are two '/ringed horses, driven by the charioteer,.
whose name is Reason. Reason has to drive the two horses and make ^hem
co-operate. It is often very difficult, for while one of the horses,
Spiri^ is w ell-bred and follows commands, Desire is very unruly, so that
they pull in opposite directions, and Reason has a great deal of trouble
to reach his destination. The soul is thus seen to be complex; it is not
compound, because while all parts of the soul have different functions,
they are all composed of one indivisible stuff. No part of it can be
separated from "the whole without ceasing to exist. Plato's reasons for
41believing this we shall discuss later.
In the Republic , Plato seems to find the soul far from being a
unity. However, the word Complex explains the conflict often found within
the soul. This is due, Plato finds, to several things, such as ignorance,
strife, failure to recollect. But the s^me soul possesses the power of
knowledge of and desire for union with the Good, or God. Instruction
brings back this knowledge, out of the "limbo of forgotten things." The
soul has, then, two problems. First, to recall the forgotten; and second,
tp preserve what has been recalled.
39 Plato, Philebus , Sec. ?5a
40 Sec. 2"53
41 See page 11
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The body is akin to the concrete, the visible, v/hich is always dif-
ferent, that is, always changing; the soul, on the other hand, finds kin-
ship with the abstract, which is changeless wisdom. No soul is to any
less extent a soul ^han any other, although some are more divine than
others. It is more often than not at odds with its body, although it
causes the body to be alive when taken possession of by the soul. The
philosopher cares little for anything that has to do with the body, but
turns toward the things of the soul. Nothing ajjout the body is an end in
itself. Through freeing himself from the demands of the body
—
practicing
dying— and so becomfc^ure, reality or truth becomes clear for the philos-
opher. No exact knowledge ever comes through sensation, only from thought.
The method by which the soul may act on the body to use for its own
ends is by being continuous with it. The soul can mix with the body be-
cause it is in itself a mixture. It inheres in body, and uses it as medi-
42
ator or vehicle. The mortal soul acts as one with the body, for sense-
43impressions. For judging and comm;ending, 'the soul is independent. This
question must have been a vital one for flato. He finally arrived at the
conclusion, mentioned above (see page 9) that the soul is homogeneous
with the body.* Both are mixtures. The soul is composed of both Form
and 3ody, as the body is. The difference is one of degree, not one of
kind. The soul is more integrated than the body. Both are motions, with
transitions from one to the other.45 The soul supplies the link between
Form and Body, and is a real entity. Both Soul and Body are creatures,
but the Soul is also a creative factor.
As was mentioned earlier, Plato feels that no part of the mind
can be separated in a physical sense from any other part Without ceasing
mind is
47to esist. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the
not physical, mi the second that lt is ^ inWv . sible enf . ty> No pflrt
*'l*fco, Timaeus, Sec. 87 a P1 ^A t c
rlat
°' ^^E' Sec - 89 47 PlatorTi Lus, Sec. 9,
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of it can exist anywhere other th£an with the complete mind of the in-
dividual to whom it belongs. Every part of a person's mind exists in his
mind, and nowhere else. Mind is an indivisible unity, a whole, no matter
how complex it may be.
He would doubtless have explained -'-.he phenomenon of multiple person-
ality, had it been brought to his attention, in one of two ways. First, he
48
might have considered it to be possession by a god or demon. Or he might,
in more modern language, explain it somewhat as follows: a body, previous-
ly accompanied by one personality, may suddenly appear to be accompanied by
more than one. These personalities stand in loose causal relationship to
each other. They are not actual subdivisions of the original, ?nd can us-
ually be redintegrated.
The unity of the soul, for Plato, is expressed by its interest in
thinking. '.Therever there is a mind, there is unity of reason; the latter
cannot function, however, unless soul, the personality, is a complete con-
scious unity. The essential principle of unity, wherever it be found, is
49
the unity of personality. The impulse of the soul to integrate itself
is another expression of its unity. Only in the Soul, says Plato, can one
find the roots of unity and permjanence, unchanging in change. Life is
the indefatigable pursuit of perfection in all things, which is true
unity. Plato has much to say about the question of how the incarnate soul
strives to re-achieve its pristine perfection, of how to be out of the body
50
while in it. This the philosopher must constantly strive to do, to
attain the perfection of the Idea of the Good, which is value in general.
51
This desire for the good is common to all rational beings, and so might
48 Plato, Apology
, Sec. 31d
49 Flato, Thaedo, S ec. 79
50 Plato, Phaedo, S ec 80e
51 Demos, FOP, 51
\
be called another expression of the unity of the soul, which is caased by
„ a
52
God.
In summarizing Plato's views, we find three main ideas in regard to
personality, which he everywhere calls the soul:
1. The soul is simple, that is, indivisible. (Phaedo )
2. The soul is complex, but unified. (Phaedrus")
3. The soul is a self-moving system with central control.
(Phaedo, Phaedrus , and others.)
We may now hazard some definitions as to Plato's use of terms. The
soul is, of course, the word he uses for the spiritual part of man. By
this word, Plato also means all facts and phases of motion. It has two parts
mortal and immortal, but both have creative factors. It must have unity
and identity to exist at all, as it is activity. It is also the bond whih
unites the creator with the creatures vfaich are devoid ofjcreative powers.
He finds soul a complete, conscious unity, striving f©r spiritual ends.
52 Demos, POP, 97
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SECTION THREE
Plato was the first philosopher definitely to consider critically
the problem of the unity of human personality, hence he has received a
somewhat extended treatment here. But he v/as far from being the last.
All through the history of philosophy thinkers have tried to find a reas-
onable, satisfactory answer^ to the question, far too many of them to in-
corporate all the views here, or even to mention the names of most of them.
The work of only a fev 7 t irpical modern idealists who have specialized in
this field, have been considered in the preparation of this thesis. The
unity of personality has long been a problem of psychology as well, but
we are here concerned only with the philosophical aspects of the question.
The first of these twentieth-century thinkers whose views are being
discussed in detail for the purposes of this paper, is Borden Parker Bowne,
a pers nnalistic idealist. In his Introduction to Psychological xheory,
the very first chapter takes up the self, and its relation to life as a
1
whole. In mental experience, says Bowne, the self is the subject of the
mental state, and no mental experience is possible without a self to un-
2
dergo that experience. The mental subject, the self, is active and abiding.
In fact, it is the only entity Bowne finds for tying experiences together.
As for Plato, so for Bowne, to understand his thought about the self,
it is necessary, while not going deeply into it, to have some slight pic-
ture of the background of his mataphysics. The system of thought which
is so peculiarly home's, is known today as personalistic idealism.
A brief discussion of personalism in general is found in Frank If*
Collier's foreword to Bowne 's Pers onalism. Mr. Collier says personalism
is grounded in human experience, common to us all. We ar all awar e of some
1 Bowne, IPT, 11
2 ^owne, IPT, 13

self-knowledge and self-direction, the two attributes of a person. For
personalism, one of whose co-founders in the United States Bowne was, says
that the Ultimate Reality, the First Cause, is a personal being, the In-
finite Person. 4 The Infinite Person is a divine being; finite persons are
human beings, limited in their activities and scope, and dependent, al-
though other thfen, the Infinite Person. The goal of imperfect human person-
ality, then starts "•"ith our universal human experience.
g
This is, of course, a theistic point of view. In an earlier book,
Bowne tells us what he means by that term. The theist is convinced that
the problem of the world and life cannot be solved without God; and the
actual world-order, including man, can only be understood as the outcome
of design. This is, of course, a matter not for demonstration, but for
rational probability. Under this metaphysic, the nature of reality appears
not as a matter of perception, but one solely of inference from the
7
phenomena. Nature is the manifestation of a spiritual power v/orking under
o
the forms of space and time. 'Ne are forced to go behind the phenomena
to explain them.
At this point we are rather more interested in the origin end nature
of the human personality, in Bowne's view. All theism must teach the
immanency of God. Selfhood and freedom distinguish the finite soul, for
whose origin he claims no pre-existence before birth. A special creation
of the Soul is made in connection with the organism to which it belongs.
Yet, aftertjiis "special creation," he says, "the conception of a unitary
and abiding soul is the only one which is not hopelessly shattered by the
most patent facts of consciousness,"
3 Bowne, PER, v 8 Bowne, THE, 7
4 Bowne, PER, v g Bowne, IPT, 3*
5 Bowne, PER, v
6 Bowne, THE, 4
7 Bowne, THE, 6

True m^n is the soul rhich is also the mind /hen it is engaged in intel-
10
lectual activities. He defines personal thinking as any mental °c+iv-
11
ity of which we are aware.
12
Bowne looks for a starting point which everyone can accept, and
.13 U
finds it in these three axioms, unprovable, but not open to question:
15
1. Co-existence of persons. 1"
2. Law of reason valid and binding for all.
o. -.orld of common experience. (17)
Before anyone can do any thinking about the Supreme Person or the
Universe or his own personalis, he must accept these three points with-
out proof. There can be no differences of opinion among philosophers in
18
regard to these. /here can be only differences in interpretations, or
reasons for conclusions. Then we can go on to find a conception of life
19
and the world which will be compatible with the high fai +hs of humanity.
"If we include God and immortality we annul materialism, which for Bowne
20
is atheism," Mr. Collier points out.
21
We are, says Bowne, in a personal world from the start. Idealistic
systems use personal experience, but transcend it, and dr°w interpretations
22
from it. TITe need philosophy because we are impelled to go beyond our
23
experience for its explanation and understanding. Everyone has some
24 25
sort of philosophy, for it is simply his way of looking at things.
In other vords, we must transcend "common sense." Common sense tells us
26
that things "hang together in certain ways , " and these ways can be studied.
That is science, through which we learn to control our inner and outer world
Vie do, however, need philosophy also, because through it we come to under-
stand reasons .why things are as they are. All we have to start with,
10 Bowne, IPT, 36 20 Bowne, PER, v
11 Bowne, PER, 15 ?1 BCwne, PER, 25
12 Bowne, PER, vii 2? Bowne, PER, 2^
13 Bowne, PER, 15 23 B ;vne, PER, 2B-9
14 Bowne, PER, 22 24 Bowne, PER, 32
15 Bowne, PER, 23 25 Bowne, PER, 5
16 Bowne, PER, 20 2" B wne, PER, x
17 Bowne, PER, 21 27 Bowne, PER, 3fi
18 Bowne, PER, 23
19 Bowne, PER, 7

is, it is true, our experience. But the names and explanations^while
they do not change that experience, help us the better to understand it and
the better to be prepared for the next one. The only duty of philosophy,
28
Bowne feels, is to help us interpret the personal -world.
V/hat is the personal world, and how can we know it? The early thinkers
before Kant, held two views. The first was that knowledge came only from
experience, without which the mind was a mere tabula rgga« The other was
29
that mind knew things independently, without experience. But^says Bowne,
both these views are superficial. Before wa ask how knowledge is possible,
we must first discover how e-p>erience is possible. Kant said it was active-
30ly constructed from within by the mind. The activity of mind has its own
immanent laws, some of which are the principles involved in the process of
31 32
knowing. Knowledge requires activity, and implies being or content,
something to know. Experience which comes through the senses is not only
the impression on the individual, but is also a symbol of the world outside.
Now we are ready to ask the question, "How can we know that world?"
Knowledge Bowne defines as a certainty that our conception corres-
ponds to reality or truth. Our minds do not make this truth; they only
recognize it. When the untruth of an idea is impossible we call the in-
sight of the mind knowledge. We know a thing only through phenomena, but
we interpret these in our own personal terms. Knowledge depends on the
34
nature of both subject and object. The subject must be active. The
meaning of anything is furnished by the mind. All permanency and identity
35
are the result of thought as sensations are discontinuous.
36
The living self is invisible, known only through deeds'. It is
28 Bowne, PER, 53 32 Bowne, PER, ^1
29 Bowne, PER, 54 33 Bowne, PER, 61
30 Bowne, PER, 55 34 Bowne, PER, 66
31 Bowne, PER, 59 36 Bowne, PER, 68
32 Bowne, PER, 60
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"as formless and invisible as God himself." Out of the invisible comes the
meaning of everything in terms of personality; this means a self-conscious
intelligence in the physical form of a body.
This body is only one phase of the external, material world, of whose
37
reality we want to be sure. Our minds cannot give us this assurance. The
only way we could tell anything for sure would be if there were "a mind at
38both ends of the process." In other words, the universe must be mental
too, or we can have no understanding of it, no comprehension of what our
senses bring to us#
For Bowne, the "Self is the mental subject knowing and experiencing
39itself as living, and as one." Things exist only in and for intelli-
40gence. They have no extra-mental existence, though they may have an
extra-human, in minds other than ^hose of full-fledged persons, God or
sub-humans.
41
The only unity Bowne finds anywhere is in the conscious self. The
unity of the thinking subject is a condition of consciousness. Memory is
impossible without an abiding I. Comparison and relation demand unity also,
42
as does the power of action. Identity also is found only in consciousness.
The unitary mental subject, he finds, is needed for thought, consciousness
43
and memory.
But the unity and completeness of the mind does not, for Bowne, mean
the same for personality. Neither is personality dependent on J he body.
44
Personality is self-knowledge and self-control. Perfection or complete-
ness is possible only in the Infinite or Absolute. We think we know inde-
45pendenoe in self-hood but it is only partial. Our independence is United
self-control. We unite both independence and dependence in our finite per-
sonalities, which are other than the Divine.
37 Bowne, PER, 73
38 Bowne, PER, 76
39 Bowne, PER, 88
40 Bowne, PER, 94
41 Bowne, PER, 103
42 Bowne, MET, 97
43 Bowne, MET, 362
44 Bowne, THE, 168
45 Bowne, PER, 281
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than the Divine*
So for Bowne we may say that, while person^ality is not unified, self
or consciousness is; this means unity in the strictest sense of identity
and continuity. The soul is distinct from body, and can live apart from
it, but never independent of the Supreme Person. '.Ye have now a clearer
understanding of Bowne' s use of terms, which are not identical with Plato's
even when he uses the same word. For instance, for Plato the word philos-
opy has its literal meaning, a love of wisdom* For him a philosopher is
a seeker after truth. But for Bowne it is also a person's way of looking
at things. The only duty it has is to help us interpret the personal
world, which for him is all the world there is.
First Cause for them both is God; but their definitions of it would
vary widely. First Cause, for Bowne^is the Infinite Person, a divine be-
ing who is the omnipresent ground of all finite experience and activity.
He is ever^.-living, ever-present, ever-working. "The Supreme Reason and
Will, the form and product of whose activity is the universe. For Plato
God is likewise activity, uncaused motion. He is pure spirit, pure
intelligence for both and for both He is other than the universe. But
the distinction between -their conceptions of God lies in the fact that
for Plato, the Demi-urg^je finished his v:ork and retired from the seene,
exc-pt for a few special occasions hen His divine presence was needed, and
left the operation of the world, and the problems of mankind^to the lesser
gods. He is said to have loved the world, but was not close spiritually
or available to His creatures. Bowne's God is immanent, and no finite
person can ever become completely independent of Him.
The Soul for Plato, as we have seen, is like God in the snnse of
being self-moving motion. Some of its activities are knowing and creating,
and it is also like God in 'hat sense. But for him it is always slightly
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mixed, in the finite version at least, with something of the body, even
though it is a unity in the sense of having identity and continuity. It
is the channel through which God transmits His activity. The human soul
has a mortal part which is not so divine, but they work together under
the guidance of Reason, which is the pilot of the soul. The mortal part
is part of the immortal but is more open to the influence of the bod;".
For Bowne the soul or self is the mental subject, knowing and experiencing.
It is living, and completely unified. True man is the soul. But Bowne
also recognizes a personality, of which the soul is a part. Neither is de-
pendent on the body, however. Personality is self-knowledge end self-con-
trol, never perfect in a finite individual, who strives for this perfection,
found in God. Self or consciousness is completely unified, in the strict-
est sense of identity and continuity, although personality is not.
3owne accepts, of course, the world of natural law, about which Plato could
know nothing, as the basis and groundwork of his metaphysics. Plato had to
figure out explanations for every thing which would fit the facts as he knew
them. He built a system with which later thinkers had to reckon, whether
they accepted it or not.
Another modern philosopher who has shown an unusikal amount of interest
in the problem of personality is Josiah Royce. But before going into his
specific doctrine of the self, let us digress to determine his general
philosophical position. In an early book he calls his doctrine an indi-
vidual, modified form of Post-Kantian Idealism. He believes first and fore-
47
most that all reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought
This means that there is no such thing as "dead matter" anywhere in the
world. Everything is an expression of spirit. Reality is such because true
46 Royce, RAP, ix
47 Royce, RAP, 433

judgments can be made about it, and also false ones. But all judgments
are present to the Infinite, good and bad. He knows what we have and what
48
we lack. All things are for thought by the Ideal Judge. The world, as
a whole must be absolutely good as the Infinite is perfect. God is the
omnipotent Ruler of things, so must be identical v.ith His creation. He
is also a self-conscious individual, ultimately real. We are all parts
of Him, one persisting through the many. Individuality is known by and in
the unity of consciousness. As the Absolute is real, so is every finite
moral individual, insofar as the moral order ill allow him to be. This
makes hi unique, in a sense free to make his own choices and to be him-
self. But he must have an ideal, a purpose, or he would not be a person
>*49
at all. "The goal assures the unity.
This self-consciousness of finite individuals is also a contrast
effect, ego against others, out of which self begins to emerge to give
continuity to the self-consciousness. The knowledge of one's self as
50
seeker lets him contrast himself with the rest of the world. One's
real self is his consciousness "hen viewed as having unity of meaning and
as exemplifying an ideal.
Our individual experience is part of God's e perience, identical with
51 52it, and God would not be complete without us. The complete fulfilment
of our purposes, our experience, is oneness with God. We are selves be-
cause we have a place in His world, and our finite purposes must be to the
end of oneness with Him. For the Absolute all life is individual but only
as it expresses a meaning, or is unified by a plan.
48 Royce, RAP, 535 & ff
49 Royce, GOG, 258
50 Royce, COG, 286
51 Royce, COG, 287
52 Royce, COG, 287-8
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There are, then, for -Koyce, two selves, the Absolute and the finite.
The finite self is the mind, the conscious experience of an individual;
the Absolute Self is all the universe in its wholeness of purpose. It is
Grod, within .Vhom every finite self takes its place.
53
There are three conceptions of the individual self. The empirical
basis for knowledge of the self is a certain class of experience; but in
54
order to understand that experienc- we must go beyond the observable facts,
"The self of our inner and outer life preserves a genuine,
although to us hidden unity." "The Ego is defined as the total-
ity oi inndr and outer experience of any of the rest of mankind.
Life presents itself as a series of contrasts between the two,
giving u.z unity and variety. But never do I observe myself as
any single and unambiguous fact of consciousness. "(55)
The second conception of ^go is the realistic—that Self is a distinct
56
entity. It preserves its unity through chaos because in itself it is one.
Royce does not agree with this. He says, "Whatever the Self is, it is
not a Thing." The real self for him is like any other real fact, a con-
scious meaning within the unity of the "Absolute Life,"
The third conception is strictly idealistic, and is the one Koyce
57
prefers. It is an ethical conception. "The true individual self. . .
gets its final expression in some form of consciousness different from
any we now possess," by which he means, of course, its perfection in the
Absolute. "The Self is just your own present imperfectly expressed pul-
58
sation of meaning and purpose." This self can be contrasted with one's
own past or future self ouite as well as with the self of another, or with
59.
life as a whole, or society as a whole, or even with God. The unity
of the self can also be expressed as the temporal whole of life, which
60
ought to be contrasted with al l the rest of life.
53 ivoyce, WI, 256 & ff.
54 Royce, 7/1, 256
55 Royce, WI, 2-4
56 Royc^, ipt, 265
57 Royce, IFT, 274
58 *oyce, IPT, 266
59 Royce, IFT, 267
60 Royce, IPT, 2 "8

Here self is an Ethical Category. "By this meaning of my life-plan,
by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another
than my fello s despite my divinely planned unity with them—by this, and
not by the possession of any Soul-Substance, I am defined and created a
62 63
Self." These are what ^oyc? calls his only "genuine terms" for de-
fining the Self. One is a "Soul" only insofar as he tries to become one
through God's will, doing His business in his am unique fashion, becoming
one with the Absolute Self— a rork finished only in eternity, it is an
ideal, never a given fact.
Royce uses unity in the sense of a v ry close relationship, union,
rather than continuous abstract identity. Matter for him is a kind of
experience of one mind caused by another mind. The finite Self is the
Kno-.rer, a human life unified by a plan.
Royce and Bowne both agree with Plato that there is no such thing
as dead matter anywhere in the world. But for Plato, Matter is simply
a shadow, a representation of the rral; for Bovne it is an expression of
God's will; for Hoyce it is a kind of experience in finite minds caused
by the Absolute. The fundamental difference between th^m is not the na-
ture of matter, but its purpose, for Plato it was a copy of the Pattern;
it was made because God wanted to create order out of the primordial chaos,
for Bo-vne and Royce it vras that we might know God's will in our o n exper-
ience.
For Royce Reality is the thought of the Absolute. £or fiowne it is
the Infinite Person. For Plato there were four kinds: God, or the Demi-
urge; the Pattern, or the Limit; the Receptacle, or the Unlimited; and
fourth, the Creature. Bowne and Royce started with our own experience
to find reality, as did Plato, but they chose different routes ^o reach it.
-1 Royce, IPT, 273
?2 Royce, IPT, 274
63 Royce, IPT, ?75

They also had very different understanding of the facts of experience.
For both Royce and Bowne, knowledge comes by way of experience, but it
goes beyond any observable facts to understand the truth. For Plato,
knowledge came through recollection of the ideal world we knew before
our birth.
For Royce, one's Self is his consciousness viewed as having unity
of meaning, and as examplifying an ideal. For Bowne, it is simple the
mental subject in any mental activity. For Plato, the Self is the soul,
the mind, the part of man that is like God. For both Boyce and Bowne
the self is not a thing, but is an activity. For Plato too, although
he had not clearly thought the problem through, we can also say that it
was an activity! but he also thought of it as some special kind of sub-
stance.
In many ways we see that ideas of Plato were the springboard from
which both Bowne and Royce started, and many of their conceptions are
traceable to him in this field of human personality.
The third philosopher whose views on the subject of human person-
ality h-ve been studied in detail is John Laird. He feels that person-
ality is one of the most interesting of studies.^ So many things affect
personality and are affected by it. We would be less than human if we
never asked, "Vilhat is man? What is the soul?" But few think out the
66
answers, and until we have done so we are not philosophers. These
problems should be studied ahead of all others because all others de-
pend on hem. He finds the tendency used to be to explain the self in
terms of something else—now we explain other things in terms of the self
L Laird, PS, 1
2 Laird, PS, 2
3 Laird, PS, 2
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The self has been called a transparent unity, to explain why, with
certain metaphysical ideas as background, we cannot see into it. but only
°7
through it. But no idealists believe this, or that the self presents
no problems. Some say it must be ultimate, others say it cannot be. But
the surest knowledge we have is of the self, because we are interested in
it. Laird's hope is to advance the knowledge a little further.
Laird is the least idealistic of the four philosophers we have studied
for this thesis. He says he is a realist, but his chief claim to belonging
to the realistic school is his theorv of knowledge, which is that the ob-
"8
ject of our knowledge is independent of our knowing it. But this is
also true of Bo/me and even of Royce, if one means "all human selves" by
"our." Further evidence will be advanced to show that he is not so far
from the idealistic position as he would have us believe.
He finds that the self is more than a collection of experiences.
Thus he opposes the familiar view of Hume,,who holds th«t. conscious exper-
ience consists of isolated states of feeling, related to e^ch other in
quite external fashion. Laird states in Chapter One of Problems of +he
69
Self
,
that it is possible to say that these experiences unite in a self
which has a .uality of permanency to make them intelligible, to explain
70
their continuity. This continuing, personal self is a unity. Any ex-
71
perience forms part of a connected whole of experience, which may be
of many kinds, and are themselves innumerable conscious processes. How-
ever, "the unity of consciousness c°nnot be merely the combination of com-
72
ponent processes." The act of comparison proves this; the unitv in these
73
ac s is the essence of the knowing self.
74
In Chapter IX, called "Unity and Continuity of the Self" he points
out that these are its most discoverable features. He develops this through
"7 Laird, PS, 4
68 Laird, SIR, 14
69 Laird, PS, 13-4
70 Laird, HOM, 228
71 Laird, PS, 194
72 Laird, PS, 202
73 Laird, PS, 203
74 Laird, PS, 213
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three kinds of unity, that of cognition, of feeling, and of endeavor.
These unities are more intimate than any other sort discoverable in ex-
perience, but are not complete or balanced in many respects, insofar as
we are ^ble to observe] t hem. There are always gaps, disunities, lack
of connection even in the most "normal" personality. Such continuity as is
77
discoverable in thought and endeavor proves the unity of personality, but
we must not overestimate this to the extent of overlooking or neglecting
78
the apparent disunion. Personal unity involves personal identity, of
79
which we feel assured by memory and our bodily sensations. But intro-
spection, Laird feels is not sufficient proof in a matter of this kind.
It is the "common- sense" view that the brain is sufficient to account for
80
the unity of mind, conscious and subconscious. There is a unity with
the self of the past, there can be no question about that.
This unity we are trying to define shows even through multiple per-
81
sonality. This is not a new thing, but scientific study of it is. In
the Old Testament we read of demoniac possession, and from time to time
throughout all the ages people have been said to have "devils in them,"
or to be "beside themselves." Science has taught us not to be afraid of
the phenomenon; but it is still mysterious. Even the Scientists do not
thoroughly understand its cause. The difficulty seems to be that there is
82
never complete dissociation, although often there appears to be. The
83
personality that appears is probably part of the original one, which
under normal conditions is relegat^ed to the sub-conscious, and is
thoroughly under control. In cases of so-called dissociation we see less
apparent unity and continuity, that is all. The sum-total of the evidence
75 Laird, PS, 213 79 Laird, PS, 246
76 Laird, PS, 215 80 Laird, PS, 251
77 Laird, PS, 217 & ff 81 Laird, PS, 272
78 Laird, PS, 236 & ff 82 Laird, PS, 273
83 Laird, PS, 275
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seems to point to the conclusion, says Laird, that all the diversities
end changes of personality are really not what they see, but that the
personality is fundamentally one.
The main problems raised by Laird are: First^whether experience is a
connected whole; and second, whether self is distinct from mind. The first
he would answer affirmatively, as proved by memory and acts of comparison.
The second answer would be negative, by his own definition, which is that
for all practical purposes, person, soul, mind, consciousness and mentality,
all mean the self, which is a continuous, unified whole.
Laird uses a much more introspective method for testing the unity and
continuity of the self than that used by Plato. He studies feeling and
endeavor, bodily sensations, and cognition, for material, and brings in
memory and acts of comparison as proofs of this. Memory is not merely a
function of the brain. Plato would agree with this. He finds memory a
proof of immortality, (which has nothing to do with the brain) through
the theory of reminis^nce.
Unity, for Laird, is continuity, as for Plato; "with its roots in
the consciousness of the p°st, it looks forward to the consciousness of
,84
the future," We find the unity of the self. The universe is held to-
85
gether in a unity which is the knowledge of the divine self. This is
definitely an idealistic conception, although the two, mind and world
(or body) are not same. Bowne ivould have a similar reason for unity
—
identity of structure throughout. Royce is the only one of the phil-
osophers who holds to a unity of self and body, and then only if we mean
the Absolute Self. His u^ity here is one of purpose, developed from
84 Laird, PS, 40
85 Laird, PS, 205

28.
86
within through variety of expression. If we speak of the finite self,
the only unity even Royce would recognize is that of mind. For Laird there
is a clear, close relationship between mental and bodily state, as for
Plato, Bowne and Royce. The mind influences the body, and vice-versa.
That is the only sort of unity of mind and body any of these men would
recognize.
Our fourth and last modern philosopher is Edgar Sheffield Brightman,
a follower of Bowne in the sense of being a personalist. His fundamental
metaphysical background is much the same. For him personality is the
87
irreducible, ultimate reality. Everything which we call impersonal, in-
cluding the very world of physical nature, is nothing but the experience
or activity of personality. "All nature is the ongoing of the conscious
activity of God."
-parT
For Brightman the body is not .of finite personality but its constant
88
environment. '.That we actually experience is our consciousnesp, with all
its mingled variety and unity, necessity and freedom, sensation and reason,
evil and values. "The person is the unitary experiencing of all these pro-
89
cesses in one whole of consciousness." But, he says, "we cannot think
about personality intelligently without thinking about its relation to the
90body." Each to a certain extent controls the other. Cur personality
91
is the first fact to betaken into consideration in deciding what body is.
The unity of personality, which is consciousness or mind, is taken for
granted; all science and philosophy arises from trying to apply the same
principle of unity to everything.
92
'Wo human being is fully personal," u says Brightm^an, but we some-
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times have flashes of insight as to what it would be lik^e. That ideal
of perfection we use in thinking about God. ifjg is perfection of conscious:
95
personality, the power that cannot be defeated.
"The human soul is the seat of perception and knowledge, could we
but know what it is . . . our knowledge of all truth would be far advanced.
The theory of mind (psychology in its broadest sense) is the most funda-
mental part of philosophy."^
Brightman makes a distinction between a self and a personality. Self
is a more general term. Anything that has consciousness is a self; but to
95
be a personality one must be able, in addition, to achieve ends. The
characteristics of a minimum selfkre: 96
1. Self-vexperience—no experiences float, but all belong to selves.
2. Qualia—distinguishable qualities of sense and feeling.
3. Time and Space—experienced by all.
4. Transcendence of time and space (unity.)
5. Process and conation.
6. Awareness of meaning.
7. Response to environment.
8. Privacy.
97 , »
The characteristics of a person (emergent traits of personality)
are the same, with additions as follows:
1. Self-experience . . . (More complex and highly organized for past
and future)
2. Qualia .... (New ones emerge obligation, taste, etc. which
are imperative norms)
3. Time and Space . . . (Range extended)
4. Transcendence . . . (More complex field of attention and better
memory)
5. Process . . . (Rises to new levels)
6. Awareness .... (Becomes conceptual thought and reasoning
7. Response .... (Becomes social and ideal; more selective)
8. Privacy .... (Understood and respected)
The unity and identity of personality is nec^essary for spiritual
development.
9 3 Brightman, IGAP, 56 96 Brightman, POR, 351,2
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"I am responsible to myself for past purposes and contracts;
yet if I am not the one who entertained those purposes and made those
contracis, I experience neither responsibility nor continuous growth.
Unless I am one person, identical through change, all hope for i mortal-
ity becomes irrational «... Finally, if personality is not a true,
identical unity it is absurd to regard God as a person, whether finite
or infinite." (98)
The unity of personality, therefore, is the unity of consciousness,
for Brightman. Personality includes consciousness only, and does not in-
99
elude any of its environment.
In Brightman 1 s paper, The Dialectical Unity Consciousness and the
Metaphysics * Religion , delivered at the Seventh International Congress
of Philosophy, he states is as his position that "some sort of unity of con-
sciousness is presupposed in all experience. " This means that the unity
is immanent in the experience. "My present is connected with all my past."
All four of the philosophers we h&jre studied are idealists, with
varying conceptions of self and personality. But all stem from Plato in
the first instance, and have views which are, in a sense, outgrowths of
his, though differing in many particulars. All agree that personality, or
the self, is conscious experience, and that the nature of the not-me is
akin to that of the me. The not-me is to be the servant of the me, and a
subject of its knowledge. All believe in the immortality of the human
personality, but differ in the particulars. Bowne and Brightman believe
in immortality continuous v.ith one's present experience. Plato and Royce
also believe in survival after bodily death, but the conditions of life
would be radically changed in the "hereafter •
"
98 Brightman, PAR, 354
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SECTION FOUR
From very early times, philosophers have been interested in studying
the super-physical part of man. With life came consciousness, it is true.
Animals have memories, and some of them have affection for their off-
spring. They can be taught certain rudimentary things. This is one step
in the long, uphill climb of evolution. But humans have something more,
that lets us appreciate the beauty of a lovely sunset, the innocence of a
baby's face, or the majestic strength of a great cathedral, built by the
hands and minds of other men, or the capable brainjajid expert fingers of
a fine surgeon. None of these interest sub-humans, or have the slightest
meaning for them. "What constitutes this difference?
Is it the same part of us that knows things, they wondered, that
remembers the experiences of yesterday or yesteryear, or of ohr childhood,
and can evaluate them in the light of what we have learned since? Is it
the same as the part that dreams when we are asleep or under anesthetic?
These and many other questions of like nature have concerned philosophers
of all ages.
Early thinkers found this thing that comes to the body with life the
soul. It seemed to be akin to breath; and associated with it. It departed
permanently with life, temporarily with consciousness from the body, and
was never, in their experience, found apart from a body. What could it
be? What was its nature?
Plato called it soul. He thought it was the most important part of
a man, and spent much of his time evolving theories about it that fit in
with the physical world as he knew it. The result was epoch-making for
all philosophy, particularly for the idealists who came after him. He
started them all off with a great deal of food for thought on this im-
portant subject.

The result of his meditations on the soul was a firm conviction that
the soul was the part which did the thinking, the divine part of man. It
dwelt in the body because it had fallen from the high, pure air of heaven
where it had contemplated Eternal Ideas and the Idea of the Good, change-
less and holy; and became attached to earth. Soul was a unity still, a
complex unity, more often than not at odds with the body injw hich it was
incarnate. The body was more or less of a nuisance to the Soul, dragging
it away to things of sense, (which were not spiritual value) having to be
fed and cared for, and constantly proving its limitations and weaknesses.
But it had a certain kinship ith Soul. There was something divine about
Body and something of the creature about Soul^even thoughj| it was more like
God than body. So the Soul tolerated it, and used it for spiritual end
intellectual ends insofar as they could be accomplished that way.
But the philosopher thought a great deal about the advantages of being
"disembodied," and "practicrik|dying, " that is, being out of the body while
in it. The philosopher always dreamed of the day when his soul could again
fly upward, untrammeled, into the world of Ideas whence it had come, and
would return again, being immortal.
Had Pla^o been possessed of more scientific knowledge, he would have
had different ideas about the creation of the soul. His myth of the Demi-
urge and the Receptacle is a far cry from our evolutionary view of the
development of the universe. But he did see clear^ly that all the functions
of the soul constituted a unity through complexity. He never heard of
personality, but many philosophers have found his soul-conception a good
substitute. The soul was also conceived by Plato as motion, activity,
both in the form of the World-Soul and of the god-created finite souls.
The soul had the power to move other J-.hings besides itself, andWas the
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only thing which had this power.
This belief in the soul as activity has been accepted by modern
philosophers as well. It was also considered to be the link between God
end the world, the channel through which He transmits His activity. It
is always invisible, we can s ee only its manifestations in others, and
experience consciousness in ourselves. Out of L his invisible self, as
it began now to be called, comes the meaning of everything. It is full
conscious life. For Bowne this self or person was the "mental subject"
without which thought, consciousness, and memory are impossible. He also
postulated a closer relationship between the finite person and the In-
finite Person. This relationship was liPental as well as spiritual. The
external world is an expression of God's will, a sort of divine language
between the Infinite and the finite. The knowledge gained of the external
world becomes material for self-knowledge and self-control, which are, for
Bowne, true personality. This is never anything but incomplete and im-
perfect in a finite person; it finds perfection in oneness with the
Infinite Person.
For Royce, the whole universe is part of God, and this includes finite
persons. Yet there is a contrast-effect of the self-consciousness of
finite souls against the rest of the universe. Self emerges to give con-
tinuity and meaning, and to exemplify an ideal. This finite self is also
part of the Absolute Self, and God would not be complete vrithout us. This
is a further development of the idea of personality striving for oneness
with God, with the inclusion of the notion that God needs us, which is new.
The idea of human personality seems to be gaining more spiritual
content, more purpose, in the thought of these twentieth century idealistic
philosophers. It is almost axiomatic with them that the self, the n.ind or

consciousness, is unified, end self- identical. This is taken for granted
since we have memory, and ere capable of purpose.
In the thought of the personalistic idealists Bowne and Brightman,
we find the latest development, of this idea of human personal ity> For
them it is the ultimate reality, from which everything else arises, all
philosophy and all science. From being a minor point, one of many worthy
of consideration, it has become central. Personalis/ is the first fact
to be taken into consideration. It is the underlying conscious experience
of an individual. The study of the working of mind has become J he most
fundamental part of philosophy.
Brighi-man 1 s ultimate view of personality differs from Bowne's, how-
eves in their views of its interpretation. For Bowne, as we have said,
personality is self-control and self-knowledge, qualities of the self
which never reach perfection in a finite person. For Brightman, person-
ality is that part of the u iverse which is i. mediately present to us
—
a datum of all experience—underlying it and immanent in it. It is in-
herent in '-he u iverse. The facts point to a orld beyond our personality,
but of the same kind. It is the final authority because of the use of
reason—by true persons, in whom alone it exists. The consummation of
the perfect personality is growth toward a sharing of perfection, a love
of one's fellowmen. This is the spiritual basis fo^ all else we hold dear.
This study of some idealistic views of personality suggest a the fol-
lowing tentative, admittedly idealistic, definition: Personality is thst
emergent quality of a self Lhat enables him to have a finitely limited
insight into what it would be like to have a share in the plans and pur-
poses of the Supreme Person, God.
For this goal of personality only provisionall-' accepted, no claim
of absolute truth is made. But if it offers inducement to further advance
in the study of the problem, it will have been worth reaching.
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